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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
VERN FRAILEY, 
Plaintiff arnd Appellant, 
vs. 
JOHX C. ~IcGARRY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 1 
BRIEF O·F APPELLANT 
STATEMENT O·F CASE 
Case No. 
2506 
The plaintiff brought this action against the de-
fendant for the purpose of rescinding a contract entered 
into by plaintiff and defendant on December 7, 1945 
and to recover from the defendant the sum of $2,600.00, 
which the plaintiff paid to the defendant in cash and 
labor performed by the plaintiff for the defendant. 
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2 
The contract which plaintiff sought to have re-
scinded contains, among others, the following provisions: 
"That the seller (defendant) for the con-
sideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and 
convey to the buyer and the buyer for the con-
sideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase 
the following described real property, situate in 
the County of Iron, State of Utah, to-wit: 
'All of Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 
12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, also 
Northeast quarter of Southwest quarter and 
Northwest quarter of Southeast quarter, all 
being in Section 6, Township 36 South, Range 
16 West S.L.M. and containing 960 acres 
more or less, according to the official survey 
thereof.' 
''It is agreed that in the event the buyer or 
any assignee shall make application to appro-
priate water or shall procure a certificate of 
app-ropriation to appropriate 'vater or shall pro-
cure a certificate to appropriate water from 
wells located upon the said premises and said 
buyer or assignee or assignees shall thereafter 
default in this contract, the seller shall im-
mediately become the assignee of any such ap-
plication or appropriation and the state engi-
neer of the state of Utah is hereby authorized 
to recognize said seller as the assignee of any 
such a~pplication and in the event a certificate 
of approp-riation has issued to the said buyer 
the water right thereunder shall he considered 
as appurtenant to the said premises and in the 
event of default the title thereto shall immedi-
ately pass to the seller. The seller reserves 
one-half of all mineral rights and oil rights 
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3 
\vhich might be appurtenant to or belonging thPre-
to. '' 
"Said buyer hereby agrees to enter into 
possession and pay for said described prem.ises 
the sum of T'venty Eight Thousand and Eight 
Hundred and No/100 Dollars, payable at office 
of John C. nicGarry, Cedar City, Utah, strictly 
"~ithin the follo,ving tin1es to 'vit: Two Thousand 
and Six Hundred and No/100 Dollars cash the 
receipt of 'vhich is hereby acknowledged. The 
remaining balance of $26,200.00 payable as fol-
lows, to-wit: On any and all lands '""here water 
wells permits are granted and allowing water 
for any given acreage, said acreage is to be tilled 
and cropped. On or before January 1st being 
termed the end of each harvest season said buyer 
is to pay to said seller, the sum of Ten Dollars 
per acre cash and in addition thereto five per-
cent (5%) interest on all deferred payments on 
each and every acre tilled and cropped until 
the full purchase price, together with interest 
has been paid. The above given $2,600.00 cash 
payment receipted herein is to be credited on the 
next :payment which becomes due and payable 
on or before January 1, 1947. 
"Said monthly payments to be applied first 
to the payment of interest and second to the 
reduction of the principal. Interest shall be 
charged from this date on all unpaid portions 
of the purchas·e price at the rate of five per cent 
per annum, payable monthly.'' 
"In the event the Buyer shall default in the 
payment of any sp~ecial or general taxes, assess-
ments or insurance premiums as herein provided, 
the seller may, at his option, pay said taxes, 
assessments and insurance premiums or either 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
of them, and if he elects so to do, then the Buyer 
agrees to repay the seller upon demand all such 
sums so advanced and paid by him, together 
with interest thereon from date of payment of 
said sums at the rate of 3A, of one per cent per 
month until paid." 
''The seller on receiving the payments herein 
reserved to be paid at the times and in the man-
ner above mentioned agrees to execute and de-
liver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and suf-
ficient warranty deed conveying the. title to the 
a:bove described premises free and clear of all 
encumbrances, except as herein mentioned and 
except as may have accured by or through the 
acts or neglect of the Buyer and to furnish at 
his expense an abstract or a policy of title in-
surance at the option of the seller brought to 
date at time of sale or at times of delivery of 
deed at th~ option of Buyer." 
''The Buyer and Seller each agree that 
should they default in any of the covenants and 
agreements contained herein to pay all costs and 
exp!enses that may arise from enforcing this 
agreement either by suit or otherwise including 
a reasonable attorney's fee." 
The contract is signed by defendant John C. !ie-
Garry, as seller, and plaintiff Vern Frailey, as buyer. 
J. E. Thompson signed as a witness. 
·There are numerous other provisions In the con-
tract which are not quoted but we do not deem such 
other provisions material to this controversy and there-
fore have omitted quoting such other provisions. 
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A COP'Y of the contract is attached to the antPHdetl 
complaint (R. 2-!) and the original contract 'vas received 
in evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit "A''. 
The grounds upon '\Yhich the plaintiff seeks to have 
the court rescind the contract as appears from the 
anrrended conrrplaint are: 
On the First Cause of Action it is in substance 
alleged that the plaintiff was induced to enter into the 
contract by the fraudulent representations of the de-
fendant in that the defendant represented that: (a) 
there was ample '\Vater available to properly i~rigate 
the real property described in the contract; (b) that the 
defendant falsely represented that he had a good title 
to the pToperty; (c) that the contract is against public 
policy as expressed in the provisions of U.C.A. 1943, 
100-3-8 which provides that a filing of a water right 
application must be made in good faith and not for 
purposes of speculation or monopoly; (d) in that at 
the time the contract was entered into the defendant 
was a married man whose wife was a resident of the 
State of Utah but that he did not inform the plaintiff 
of said fact or have his wife join in the contract so that 
she could be held to the performance thereof. 
The Second Cause of Action is founded upon the 
failure and refusal of the defendant to furnish the plain-
tiff with an ~bstract of title to the property described in 
the contract; notwithstanding a demand was made fo:r 
such abstract. 
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The ·r;rhird Cause of Action is based upon the claim 
that the contract is against the public policy of this 
state and particularly U .C.A. 1943, 100-3-8 in that the 
defendant by the contract is seeking to speculate in the 
public waters of the state by attempting to sen land 
which was of the market value of $1.50 per acre with-
out water for $30.00 per acre if and when plaintiff 
provides water for the land, and thereby defendant 
attempted to secure a profit of $28.·50 p~er acre o~ 2000 
per cent if and when water is received by the plaintiff 
for irrigation of said land. 'That if the contract is held 
valid it will result in an unco~scionable profit to the 
defendant as a result of his speculating in the public 
waters of the State of Utah without the defendant ex-
pending any Iabor or money .in developing or putting 
to a beneficial use the public waters of the State of Utah. 
In the Fourth Cause of Action it is alleged that the 
contract which it is sought to rescind is so uncertain 
as to render the same invalid in that it cannot be de-
termined therefrom when, if ever, plaintiff is entitled 
to a conveyance of the property described in the con-
tract, nor can it be determined from said contract when, 
if at all, the interest or the amount provided for in 
such contract begins, or the amount of the purchase 
price ; that is to say whether interest is payable from the 
date of such contract or only on the amount that be-
comes due because some of the acreage of such land 
is irrigated, tilled and cropped. That no consideration 
whatsoever was given or agreed to 'be given by the de-
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fendant for $26,200.00 of the amount provided for in 
said contract and therefore sueh provision is invalid. 
In each c.ause of action the plaintiff sought to re-
cover $500.00 as attorney's fees for the prosecution of 
the action. (R. 12 to 2-±) 
To the amended complaint the defendant filed a 
demurrer to each cause of action (R. 25) and a motion 
to strike. (R. 27) 
D·efendants motion to strike was granted and his 
.. demurrer to the Second, Third and Fourth causes was 
sustained but overruled as to the First Cause of Action. 
(R. 29) 
Thereafter the defendant filed an answer and cross-
complaint (counterclaim). 
In the answer the defendant denied that any fraud 
was perpetrated upon the plaintiff in the execution 
of the contract. (R. 30 to 34) As a further affirmative 
defense and as a cros·s complaint defendant seeks to 
have declared forfeited any rights the p~aintiff may 
have in the contract because of his having failed to pay 
the taxes on the property described in the contract 
and because he has failed to plant any crops or till any 
of the land described in the contract notwithstanding 
he has filed with the state engineer applications to ap-
propriate water to irrigate such lands and at least one 
of such applications has been granted by the state en-
gineer, and because plaintiff has abandoned the con-
tract. (R .. 34 and 36) 
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To the answer and cross complaint the plaintiff 
filed a reply and answer in which he admitted that he 
had not paid the taxes on the premises described in 
the contract. He alleged that he went to the attorney 
for the defendant and through him made filings for 
appropriation of a water right to irrigate the lands 
described in the contract and denied generally the other 
allegations of the answer and cross complaint. (R. 38 
to 41) 
Upon the issues thus raised by the amended com-
plaint, the answer and cross -complaint of the defendant 
and the reply and answer of the plaintiff a trial was 
had. After the conclusion of the trial ~nd the filing 
of briefs of counsel the court made and filed its meno-
randum of decision. (R. 62 to 68) In such memorandum 
of decision the court found, among other things, that 
the defendant had perpetrated fraud on the plaintiff 
as to the availability of water to irrigate the lands 
described in the contract; that the plaintiff had not 
established the lack of good title in the defendant; that 
the land described in the contract was of a value not 
to exceed $1.50 .:per acre without water but with water 
was of a value of $30.00 per acre. The court concluded 
that if the plaintiff would transfer his own, and secure 
a transfer of the filings to appropriate water held by 
Thompson, then and in such case the defendant should 
repay to the plaintiff the $2'600.00 paid on the contract 
together with the money paid by plaintiff and Thon1pson 
for filing fees, and together with legal interest thereon, 
otherwise the defendant should retain the money paid 
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9 
to him by the plaintiff on the contrac.t and defendant 
should also have decreed to hin1 all of the filings Inade 
by plaintiff and Thon1pscn nnd retain the land described 
in the contract free fron1 any and all claims of the plain-
tiff. The plaintiff "~as giYen ''fifteen days to give notice 
to the court and to counsel for defendant as to w·hether 
plaintiff and Thompson will transfer to defendant the 
water application herein referred to and in case plain-
tiff_ does not so elect then counsel for plaintiff (de-
fendant) may prepare and submit findings, conclusions 
and decree disposing of the case in accordance here-
with.'' The plaintiff gave no notice within the fifteen 
days allowed, or at all, that he would make the transfer 
of his water fillings or that he could secure the water 
filings of Thompson whereupon the trial court made 
its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree. 
(R. 70 to 79) 
By its Judgement a.nd Decree the court held that 
the contract of sale and purchase Plaintiff's Exhibit 
''A'' was not subject to rescission hy the plain tiff and 
that plaintiff take· nothing hy reason of his amended 
complaint; that plaintiff has defaulted in and has 
breached the said contract and the same is hereby de-
clared to be forfeited and terminated and all rights of 
the plaintiff in and to all of the property therein de-
scribed are hereby declared to be lost, cancelled, for-
feited and terminated. 
It is from the judgement so made and entered that 
plaintiff prosecutes this appeal. 
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ASSIGNMEN'TS OF ERROR 
The plaintiff and appellant assigns the following 
errors committed by the trial court upon which he relies 
for a reversal of the judgement and decree appealed 
from and for an order of this court directing the trial 
court to enter a judgement and decree as prayed for 
in plaintiff's amended complaint. 
1. The trial court erred in granting defendant's 
motion to strike and in sustaining defendant's demurrer 
to the second cause of action set up in plaintiff's 
amended complaint. (R. 29) 
2. The trial court erred in granting defendant's 
motion to strike and in sustaining defendant's demurrer 
to the Third Cause of Action set out in plaintiff's 
amended complaint. (R. 29) 
3. The trial court erred in granting defendant's 
motion to strike and in sustaining defendant's demurrer 
to plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action (R. 29) set out 
in plaintiff's amended complaint. 
4. The trial court erred in striking paragraph 11 
of plaintiff's first cause of action set out in plaintiff's 
amended comp~laint. (R. 16) 
5. :The trial court erred in striking paragraph 12 
of plaintiff's first cause of action set out in plaintiff's 
amended complaint. 
6. The trial court erred in striking paragraph 17 
of plaintiff's first cause of action as alleged in his 
amended complaint. (R. 29) 
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7. The trial court erred in Inaking its conelusion 
of la"" numbered 2 wherein it is concluded: ~~That said 
contract is not no"T subject to rescission because the 
plaintiff has not offered to rescind said contract in its 
entirety.'' That such conclusion is without support in 
either the evidence or the Findings of Fact and especial-
ly is it at variance \Yith the allegations of plaintiff's 
amended complaint. (R. 77) 
8. The trial court erred in making its conclusion 
of law numbered 3 and the whole thereof in that such 
conclusion of law is without sup~port in either the evi-
dence or the findings of fact and is contrary to law. 
(R. 77) 
9. The trial co~ erred in malting its fourth con-
clusion of law in concluding that plaintiff's failure to 
till and crop any part of said premises, to drill any 
wells on said premises for the irrigation thereof and 
to make any further payments thereunder constituted 
a breach of said contract. That such conclusion of 
law is without support in either the evidence or the 
findings of fact. (R. 77) 
10. The trial court erred in making that part of 
its fourth conclusion of law wherein it concluded that 
"because of such default on the part of plaintiff the 
defendant under his cross complaint is now entitled to 
declare the same forfeited and terminated and all rights 
of the plaintiff thereunder forfeited.'' That such con-
clusion of law is without support in either the evidence 
or the findings of fact and is contrary to Law. (R. 77) 
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11. The trial court erred in its Judgement and 
Decree wherein and whereby it adjudged and decreed 
''That the contract entered into by defendant and plain-
tiff is not subject to a rescission by the plaintiff.'' 
and that plaintiff take nothing by reason of his amended 
complaint. That said judgement is without support in 
either the findings of fact or the evidence and is con-
tary to law. (R. 79) 
12. The trial court erred in making its judgement 
and decree wherein it adjudged and decreed that all 
rights of the plaintiff in and to all of the property 
described in the complaint are declared to be lost, can-
celled, forfeited and terminated, that such decree and 
judgement is without support in either the evidence 
or the findings of fact. (R. 79) 
13. The trial court erred in that it failed to de-
cide all of the issues raised at the trial of this cause 
and particularly in that the decree and judgement does 
not determine who is entitled to the water right 'appli-
cations which were filed by the .plaintiff and Thompson 
in the office of the State Engineer. (R. 79) 
14. 'The trial court erred in failing to find that 
he, the plaintiff, had farming equipment in the State 
of California which he would ship to Utah for use in 
clearing and p-reparing for crops on any land that he 
might purchase, as alleged in paragraph 4 of plaintiff's 
amended complaint. (R. 13-14) and as established with-
out conflict by the evidence. ( Tr. 10) 
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15. The trial court erred in undertaking to ad-
judicate and in adjudicating the rights of Jerold E. 
Thompson in and to the 'vater right applications uutde 
by him in the office of the State Engineer notwith-* 
standing he 'vas not a party to this action and the 
court 'vas therefore 'vithout jurisdiction to adjudicate 
such right. 
16. The trial court erred in failing to grant ,plain-
tiff the relief prayed for in his amended complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
It will be noted that in his motion to strike the 
defendant sought to have stricken the allegation re-
lating to the contract between plaintiff and defendant 
being against the public policy of this state and particu-
larly those provisions thereof contained in U.C.A. 1943, 
100-3-8 which in effect provide that the state engineer 
shall not approve an application to app-ropriate water 
when the same is filed for the purpose of speculation 
or monopoly. (R. 15) The motion is at page 27 of the 
judgement roll, paragraph 1 thereof. The trial court 
granted the motion at the time it was argued but at the 
beginning of the trial the court reversed its ruling and 
reinstated the allegations theretofore stricken. ( Tr. 2.) 
That being so we have not assigned such ruling as 
error. 
It will also be observed that the trial court found 
that the defendant made the false representation alleged 
in the amended complaint and that plaintiff in reliance 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
thereon entered into the contract between him and the 
defendant. That being so we shall not at this time 
review the evidence touching that phase of the case. 
While the plaintiff takes the position that it having 
been determined that the defendant was guilty of the 
fraud alleged in the amended complaint it follows, as 
a matter of 'law, that plaintiff is entitled to the relief 
prayer still we shall in this, plaintiff's original brief, 
argue the other assignments of error because even 
though, if for any reason plaintiff is not entitled to the 
relief p.rayed because of the fraud perpetrated upon 
him, still he is entitled to prevail on the assigned errors 
other than those touching the question of fraud. 
THE CONTRACT BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND 
DEFENDAN·T I:S AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY 
AND THEREFORE THE COURT ERRED IN 
STRIKIN·G THE THIRD CAUSE OF ACTIO·N 
SET OUT IN THE AMENDED CO·MPLAIN'T 
We have a law now in effect and in effect when 
the contract here involved was entered into which in 
part provides : 
"It shall be the duty of the state engineer, upon 
the payment of the approval fee to approve an 
application if * * * * 4 The applicant has the fi-
nancial ability to complete the proposed works 
and the application was filed in good faith and 
not for the purpose of speculation or monopoly.'' 
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That the defendant seeks to secure to hilnself an un-
conscionable profit out of the public waters of this 
shtte is obvious. The evidence shows and the trial 
court found that the land w·ithout water was at the 
time complained of 'vorth $1.50 per acre and when water 
is available for the irrigation of the land it is worth 
$30.00 per acre. ( Tr. 122, R. 23) 
The evidence further sho,vs that the plaintiff signed 
a contract to purchase from defendant 160 acres of land 
in the latter part of November or the first of December, 
1945 and at that ~e plaintiff signed an application 
to appropriate water for the 160 acres of land covered 
by the contract and that he paid the filing fee. ( Tr. 8-9) 
That application was assigned to defendant at the time 
plaintiff and defendant entered into the contract here 
involved. (Tr. 10) It will further he noted that the 
defendant acquired the land described in the contract 
on November 7, 1945. (R. 60) The price paid by de-
fendant is not made to appear, except the deed to him 
recites the sum of $10.00. 1\Ir. Edward H. Parry, who 
purchased approximately 1880 acres of land, including 
the land described in the contract, paid $1.50 per acre. 
The sale was confirmed on October 9, 1945. (R. 56) 
The documents a:bove referred to are found in the Judge-
ment Roll and not among the exhibits. 
Thus under the contract, if the same is construed 
as the defendant contends it should be construed, he is 
to receive a profit of $27,360.00 if and when the plain-
tiff, solely at his own expense, makes application to 
appropriate water or procures a certificate to appro-
priate water from wells located upon the property 
described in the contract. If such a contract does not 
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constitute a speculation on behalf of the defendant in 
the public waters of this state it is impossible to con-
ceive of transactions which may be said to -constitute 
speculation. 
It is of course an elementary principle of law that 
one may not do indirectly that which he may not do 
directly. In this case the plaintiff and his brother-in-
law J. C. Thompson sought to secure from the State 
Engineer the right to develop some of the public waters 
for a beneficial purpose, namely: for the irrigation 
of land. Under the contract, as defendant contends it 
should he construed, the plaintiff is required to pay to 
the defendant $27,360.00 for the privilege of exercising 
a right which the plaintiff and Thompson seek to ac-
quire from the State Engineer. If the defendant had 
hin1self gone to the State Engineer and represented 
that he desired to file on sufficient water to irrigate 
the 960 acres of land which he in tended to sell or had 
sold to the plaintiff under a contract whereby he, de-
fendant, was to receive a profit of $28.50 per acre on 
account of the water filing can there be any doubt that 
under such circumstances it would have been the clear 
duty of the state engineer to refuse such a request~ 
The scheme adopted by the defendant in the questioned 
contract is at least as objectionable, if not more ob-
jectionable, :than the supposed case. 
·Thus it will ibe seen that by the terms of the con-
tract here in controversy the plaintiff does not obligate 
himseif to apply for any water to irrigate the lands 
described in the contract. If however .plaintiff shall 
apply for or develop water then and in such event he 
is required to pay homage to the defendant to the tune 
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of $27,360.00, together "ith interest on any deft\rrPd 
pay1nent at 5% per annum. l\IorPnYer by the contraet 
here brought in question the defendant seeks to change 
the la,vs of this state so that any application to appro-
priate 'vater made by the plaintiff shall be appurtenant 
to the land described in· the contract, not,vithstanding 
this eourt has held the la'v to be otherwise. Duchesn.e 
Co1.tnty rs. Humpherys, 106 [Tt. 332, 1!8 Pa.c. (2) 338. 
It would seem obvious that one of the purposes, 
if not the sole purpose, of the legislature in condemning 
speculation in the public ";aters of this state is to re-
move impediments that may stand in the way of the 
development of the natural resources of the state. If 
the public -waters of this state are to be the subject of 
speculation and profits and enormous sums of money 
are to be paid to persons who take no part in the de-
velopment of such waters the inevitable result is to 
retard development. The present controversy is an out-
standing illustration of the results that follovv in the 
wake of such a practice. 
The evidence in this case shows that the plaintiff 
entered into the contract with the defendant and came 
to Utah from California with the intention to engage 
in farming upon a somewhat large scale. When he 
learned that it was at least very doubtful if he could 
acquire sufficient water to irrigate the lands which he 
had agreed to purchase and probably when he learned 
of the further fact that he was being defrauded by the 
defendant out of $27,360.00 for the right to use a water 
right which the defendant did not own· it is no wonder 
that plaintiff first hestitated and then concluded that 
he should not and probably could not go through with 
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his plan to develop the 960 acres of land which he under-
took to purchase and develop. If the ·State of Utah 
should approve a pr.ocedure calculated to enrich the 
speculator and retard the development of its natural re-
sources it is headed towards stagnation rather than 
progression. 
If the contract here involved is considered from a 
different point of view its provsions are likewise against 
public policy. There is a well recognized rule of law 
that a contract in restraint of trade is against public 
policy. 17 C.J.S. 22, et seq. The reason for such doc-
trine is that people should be encouraged to be produc-
tive and not inactive. The contract between plaintiff and 
defendant is calculated to discourage the plaintiff from 
developing water to irrigate the land covered by the con-
tract, that is to say if he developed water he must pay 
to the defendant the additional sum of $26,200.00 for 
the privilege of doing so. If he chooses not to apply 
for a water right to irrigate and develop the property 
described in the contract he is free to do so without in-
curring any additional obligation. 
So far as we have been able to find this court has 
not passed upon a contract involving the construction 
of the provisions of U.C.A. 1943, 100-3-8, which have 
heretofore been quoted. There is a somewhat early case 
in this jurisdiction which was decided before the enact-
ment of the foregoing statute which seems to hold that 
independent of statute it is against the public policy of 
this state for one to sp·eculate in its public waters. See 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
Sawards, et al vs. Meagher, .et a.l, 37 Uta,h 212, at page 
222; 108 Pac. 1112 at page 1116. 
The law, however, is "~ell and uniformly established 
that a contract 'vhich is against public policy will not 
receive the sanction of the courts. 17 C.J.S. 763, et seq. 
and cases cited in the footnotes. 
THE PLAINTIFF HAD A RIGHT TO RESCIND 
THE CONTRACT BECAUSE THE 'SAME IS 
AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY 
It is alleged in the amended complanit that at and 
prior to the time he entered into the contract, Exhibit 
"A'', the plaintiff was not familiar with the practices 
and customs prevailing in the state of Utah with respect 
to the manner and procedure for acquiring a right to 
use underground water. (Paragraph 5, page 3 of the 
Judgment Roll). He so testified at the trial. Such alle-
gation is by reference made a part of plaintiff's Third 
Cause of Action. (R. 20) 
While the cases generally hold that where a contract 
is illegal the courts refuse to grant either of the parties 
relief. Such rule has no application where the parties 
are not in pari delecto. 17 C.J.S. Sec. 201, ·page 555-6 and 
Sec. 211, page '563. 
For a discussion of the law touching the relief 
afforded to a party to a contract not equally at fault 
with the other party where public policy will be advanced. 
See 17 C.J.S., page 660, Sec. 274. That is especially ·so 
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where the illegal purpose is not consummated. 17 C.J .. S., 
p~age ·662, Sec. 275. There are numerous cases cited in 
the footnotes which sustain the text. The law announced 
in the text is so well and uniformly established that we 
shall not burden the court with a review of the cases. 
Moreover such contracts may not he ratified. Nor does 
the doctrine of waiver or estoppel apply to such con-
tracts, especially where they contravene public policy. 
See 17 C.J.S., Sec. 279, page 668 and cases cited in the 
footnotes. 
The law will also be found discussed at some length 
in Black 'On Rescission, Vol. 2, ~page 844, 8 ec. 313, et seq. 
OJYI)d ~at 'P!age 868, 8 ec. 322. 
It will be noted that the plaintiff in this case was 
in no sense guilty of speculating in the public waters of 
this state. Under the decision rendered by the trial 
court that is the sole prerogative of the defendant. 
UNDER 'THE DECISION ·OF THE 'TRIAL COURT 
THE DEFENDANT IS REWARDED BECAUSE 
OF THE FRAUD PERPETRATED UPO·N 
THE PLAINTIFF 
It is of course the uniform purpose of law and of 
equity to prevent one guilty of fraud from reaping the 
p,rofits of his fraudulent acts. Under the decision of the 
trial court the defendant is not only given all of the 
profits that he could hope to realize if the contract had 
been free from fraud or other objections hut in addition 
thereto the court apparently awarded the defendant the 
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applications to appropriate "'ater filed by J t:'rold E. 
Thompson, the brother-in-la"' of the plaintiff, not"'"ith-
standing there is nothing in the contrnrt "·hich provides 
that he is entitled thereto and notw·ithstanding Jerold 
E. Thompson was not a party to the contrart. It will 
be noted that the contract proYides that ''in the event 
the buyer or an~~ assignee shall make application to ap-
propriate water or shall procure a certificate to appro-
priate "\Yater from wells located upon the said premises 
and said buyer, as assignee, or assignees, shall there-
after default in this contract the seller shall immediately 
become the assignee of any such application * * *.'' 
Jerold E. Thompson is not and never has been the as-
signee of the plaintiff of the applications made hy 
Thompson to appropriate water. Not only that but 
Thompson was never a party to this proceeding. Not-
withstanding such being the state of the record it was 
apparently the intention of the trial court to award to 
the defendant the water filings made hy Thompson. We 
say apparently because of the provisions of the last 
paragraph of the judgment and decree wherein it is 
provided that the plaintiff has defaulted in and has 
breached the said contract, and the same is hereby de-
clared to be forfeited and terminated and all rights of 
the plaintiff in and to all of the property therein des-
cribed are declared to be lost, cancelled, forfeited and 
terminated. By such provision the trial court may or 
1nay not have assumed that the water filings made by 
Thompson belongs to Frailey. If the court assumed 
that such filings belonged to Frailey such assumption is 
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wholly without support in the evidence. If the trial court 
did not so assume it was none the less error for the court 
to fail to find and decree that the same did not belong to 
plaintiff but belonged to ·Thompson. It is, of course, 
one of the cardinal principles of law that when a court 
of equity takes jurisdiction of a cause it is required to 
dispose of all questions presented to the end that every 
·controversy is disposed of. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DE-
CIDE ALL .O·F THE IS·SUES IN THIS CAUSE 
AND IN UNDERTAKING T·O ADJUDICATE 
THE WATER RIGH·T APPLICATION 
OF JEROL.D E. THOMPSON 
By assignments numbered 13 and 15 plaintiff at-
tacks the last paragraph of the judgment and decree 
(R. 79) wherein it is decreed that all rights of the plain-
tiff are forefeited in and to all of the property described 
in the contract. It is by no means clear just what is 
meant by the judgment. It will be noted that no water 
right applications are described in the contract. Cer-
tainly the water right applications of Thompson are not, 
therein described and as we have pointed out under the 
preceding heading such water ·right is not even referred 
to in the contract, because Thompson is not an assignee 
of plaintiff hut on the contrary he is the original appli-
cant for a water right. Moreover it may be open to 
serious doubt if the water filings are property, but even 
if they are they are not described in the contract. Thus 
it is plaintiff's position that the decree is so vague and 
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uncertain as to be at least voidable if not absolutely void, 
and as we have heretofore pointed out if the decree and 
judgment is not vulnerable to attack because of it~ un-
eertainlY it is none the le~s 'Yithout support in the evi-
"' 
dence and is contrary to law. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING TIIE 
~IOTION TO STRIKE THE SECOND CAUSE 
OF ACTION SET OUT IN PLAIN-
TIFF''S AMENDED COMPLAINT 
The trial court granted defendant's motion to strike 
the Second Cause of Action set out in plaintiff's amended 
complaint. (R. 18, 27, 29) Plaintiff has assigned such 
ruling as error. The contract between plaintiff and de-
fendant contains this provision: 
"The Seller on receiving the payments here-
in reserved to be paid at the times and in the 
manner above mentioned agrees to execute and 
deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and suf-
ficient warranty deed conveying the title to the 
above described premises free and clear of all en-
cumbrances, except as herein mentioned and ex-
cept as may have accrued by or through the acts 
or neglect of the Buyer, :(JJJ'td tlo fw.nish ·at his 
expense an ·abstract or a policy of t?;t:le insu!fiance 
at the option ·of the seller brought to date ~at the 
time of sale Of" at time -of delJivery of ·deie.d at the 
option of the Buyer.'? (Italics supplied.) 
At the time of the argument of the motion to strike 
the trial court took the view that the defendant was under 
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no obligation to furnish an abstract of title or a policy 
of title insurance until he was paid for the property in 
full. As we read the provisions of the contract above 
quoted they are not subject to such a construction. The 
seller agreed to do two things. To furnish an abstract of 
title or a policy of title insurance at the option of the 
seller brought to date at time of sale or at time of the 
delivery of the deed at the option of the buyer (the 
plaintiff) and to execute and deliver a deed conveying 
a good title to the buyer. 
It will be noted that the form of contract used by the 
parties to the contract here involved was a uniform sales 
contract which is in general use in Utah. N otwithstand-
ing that form of contract has been in general use in Utah 
for a number of years, this is the first time that the 
writer of this brief has learned of anyone placing the 
construction on the contract that was given it by the 
trial court. Moreover the language above quoted gives 
the buyer the option to require an abstract or policy of 
insurance brought to date at time of sale or at time of 
delivery of the deed. If the seller, defendant, is not obli-
gated to furnish an abstract until he receives all of his 
money and delivers a deed there would be no sense in 
the buyer having an abstract or policy of title insurance 
as of the time of sale. O·bviously an abstract of title or 
policy of title insurance as of the time of delivery of 
deed would be effective as of the time of sale. Moreover 
the purpose of the buyer being entitled to an abstract or 
policy of title insurance was to furnish the buyer protec-
tion against the contingency that the seller might receive 
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all or substantiallY all of his monev and then be unable 
. . 
to convey title, with the result that the buyer n1ay have 
parted \Yith his money \Yithout being ablt> to recover the 
same or the premises. ..~..\. construction of the eontraet 
such as that given by the trial rourt is "rithout support 
in the language of the contract as \Yell as at variance \Vith 
the common practice of those \Yho engag-e in transactions 
for the sale and purchase of real estate \Yhere the pay-
ments are extended over a substantial period of time. 
In connection \Yith what we have said touching the 
striking of the Second Cause of Action the attention of 
the court is directed to the allegation contained in para-
graph 12 of plaintiff's First Cause of Action, which was 
striken by the trial court and \vhich we have assigned 
as error in assignment 5. 
If the defendant had furnished an abstract or policy 
of title insurance plaintiff could have ascertained if 
the wife of the defendant had conveyed to him her in-
choate interest in the property or that she become obli-
gated to join in the conveyance when the money was paid 
for the property. The outstanding inchoate interest of 
defendant's wife is of course a cloud upon his title. 
The sole purpose of the provision in the contract 
requiring the seller to furnish the ~buyer an abstract or 
policy of title insurance at the time of sale was to en-
able the buyer to protect himself against the possibility 
that he might pay for the property and then when the 
time for conveyance arrives he unable to secure title 
to the purchased property. 
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The following cases support the proposition that if 
a seller who has agreed to furnish an abstract or policy 
of title insurance fails and refuses to do so the buyer 
may rescind the contract of purchase and recover any 
money that he may have paid on the -contract: 
Austin vs. Shipmatn, 160 Mo. App. 206; 141 ·S.W. 425 
McChesney vs. Appek, 15·6 Min. 260; 194 N.W. 882 
K ne:eZarnd vs. H etz.el, 103 Okla. 3; 229 Pac. 218. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERR.ED IN GRANTING D-E-
FENDANT'S MOTION TO 'STRIKE THE 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTI·ON SET 
O·UT IN PLAINTIFF '·S 
AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
Heretofore in this brief we have discussed the con-
tract, Plaintiff's Exhibit "A", on the assumption that 
such contract is sufficiently definite and certain to enable 
the court to ascertain what was the intention of the 
parties when such contract was entered into. It was 
apparently on the assumption that the terms of the con-
tract were sufficiently certain to enable the court to as-
certain what the parties intended that the trial court 
sustained the demurrer and granted the motion to 
strike the Fourth Cause of Action set out in plaintiff's 
amended complaint. (R. 29) 
By our argument touching the various other rea-
sons why the judgment of the court below should be re-
vers.ed we do not wish to be understood as conceding 
that the contract is sufficiently certain to enable a court 
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to ascertain what was tl1e intention of the parties thereto 
and to give effeet to such intention. 
We have already :pointed out that there is nothing 
in the contract "Thereby the plaintiff obligates hhnself 
to apply for any water to irrigate the lands described 
in the contract. In the event the plaintiff should not ap-
ply for a water right there is nothing in the contract 
which indicates what shall be the rights of the parties 
or when, if at all, plaintiff is entitled to. a conveyance of 
the premises. If plaintiff should fail to apply for a 
water right is the $2600.00 paid on the contract to be in 
full payment for the land~ If not is the plaintiff required 
to pay more or less than $2600.00, if so, how much more 
or less~ There is no language in the contract from which 
the court can find any answer to these questions. The 
contract provides that ''on any and all lands where water 
well permits are granted and allowing water for any 
given acreage said acreage is to he tilled and cropped.'' 
Suppose permits are granted and water is allowed but 
no water is actually developed must such lands never-
theless be tilled and cropped~ To give effect to such 
language according to its meaning would require the 
plaintiff to till and crop land even though no water is 
or can be developed. Can it be that such was the in-
tention of the parties to the contract~ We don't know 
and it is impossible for anyone to ascertain from the 
language used when viewed in the light of the purposes 
of the contract. Just what function the language ''on or 
before January 1st'' being termed the. end of each har-
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vest season serves in the contract we are at a loss to 
ascertain. 
The contract then provides that "said buyer is to 
pay said seller the sum of Ten Dollars per acre cash and 
in addition thereto five percent (5%) interest on all de-
ferred payments in cash and every acre tilled and 
cropped. Until the full purchase price, together with 
interest has been paid.'' Supposing that no land is tilled 
or cropped what then~ No one can tell. Is the five per-
cent interest provided for in the contract to be paid only 
on each and every acre tilled and cropped or is the 5% 
interest payable on the whole $28,800.00~ No one can 
tell from the language of the contract. The language 
just quoted indicates that the 5% interest is payable 
only on the land that is tilled and cropped and upon 
which there is a deferred payment. How frequently is 
the $10.00 per acre to be paid on the land tilled and 
cropped~ No one can tell from the language used in the 
contract. Contrary to the provision of the contract above 
quoted it is provided that monthly payments shall be 
made and interest from this date at 5% per annum. 
What was the agreement of the parties with respect to 
payments that were provided for in the typewritten por-
tion of the contract just quoted and the provision in the 
printed portion of the contract immediately following~ 
Again no one ean tell. 
If the language of a purported contract is so vague 
and uncertain that the courts cannot ascertain therefrom 
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"That is intended the court 'Yill declare the sa1ne void. 
12 __ A_nl. Jnr., page 554, Sec. 6-± and cases there cited. 
THE CONTRACT HERE IN\"'"()L \'"ED W A:S \ 70ID 
FROM ITS INCEPTION IN SO FAR A'S IT 
DEALS \v"'ITH \v.,._A_TER RIGHTS BE-
CAUSE OF THE I)lPOSSIBILITY 
OF PERFORl\1ANCE. 
The authorities teach that when a contract is im-
possible of performance at the time of its execution it 
is invalid. Page on ·Cont!f'iacts, 17ol. 5, page 4698, Sec. 
2670, and cases there cited. 
It is alleged in the First Cause of Action and the 
trial court found that there was not sufficient water 
available to irrigate the lands described in the agreement 
between plaintiff and defendant. (See paragraphs 7 and 
8 of the amended -complaint. R. 14 and paragraph 9 of 
the Findings of Fact. R. 72) It is also alleged and found 
that the plaintiff believed that there was sufficient water 
to irrigate the lands described in the contract and that 
he would not have entered into the contract if he had 
known that there was not sufficient water to irrigate 
such premises. (Paragraph 9 of the amended complaint. 
R. 15 and paragraph 13 of the Findings of Fact. R. 73) 
Thus the plaintiff did not assume the risk of there being 
an insufficient supply of water when he entered into 
the contract and therefor the same is invalid because 
of the impossibility of performance or mistake of fact. 
That being so the plaintiff is, upon such ground, en-
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titled to rescind the contract, or more accurately there 
was no contract. 17 ·C·.J.S. ~S'ec. 962, page 952 and cases 
there cited. 
THERE W .NS A PARTIAL IF NOT A COMPLE·TE 
F AILUR.E O·F C~ONSIDERATION FOR THE 
MONEY WHICH PLAINTIFF AGREED TO 
PAYIFANDWHEN A WATERRIGHT 
WAS ACQUIRED. 
The general rule is that a failure or even a partial 
failure of consideration will justify the rescission or 
cancellation of an obligation in equity. 1 Black on Res-
cission, 2 Ed., Sect. 159; Sterling vs. Gr.eg;ory, 149 Cal. 
117; 85 Pac. 305; Sinteon vs. Klirnze, 66 Mont. 314; 213 
Pac. 440; Willi.an~s vs. Butter, 58 Ind. App. 47; 105 N.E. 
387; 107 N.E. 300. 
While in this case the defendant did not agree that 
plaintiff should receive a vvater right, or for that matter 
make any agreement with respect to ~ water right other 
than to require the payment of an unconscionable sum 
of money by the plaintiff if he should ch?ose to develop 
a water right. The defendant certainly acquired no 
greater right to have the contract enforced because of the 
complete or partial failure of considHration received by 
plaintiff because the consideration was to come from the 
public resources of the state rather than from some 
right possessed by the defendant. It will be noted that 
the plaintiff in his fourth cause of action, paragraph 3c, 
(R. 22) alleges that defendant gave no consideration for 
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the $26,200 which "'"as to be paid if and 'vhen n "~ater 
right was acquired for the pre1nises dr·seribed in t hP eon-
tract. As heretofore pointed out that cause of action 
,vas ordered stricken and such order is assigned as error. 
BOTH THE CONCLUSIONS OF LA ''r AND THE 
JUDG~IE~T AND DECR,EE ~\RE 'VITHOUT SUP-
PORT IN THE E\~DENCE AND LIKEWISE 
WITHO·lTT SUPPORT IN THE FIND-
INGS OF FACT. 
In its Memorandum of Decision the court found that 
the defendant was guilty of the fraud charged in the 
amended complaint. Notwithstanding such findings the 
court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to par-
tially rescind the contract, that is to a return of the 
money which he had paid on the contract, if within fif-
teen days he and Thompson should assign to the de-
fendant all of the water filings which they paid for and 
filed in the office of the State Engineer. (R. 68) 
In order to fully appreciate the injustice to the plain-
tiff of the requirement that he and Thompson assign 
to the defendant their water filings before plaintiff could 
secure even a partial relief because of the fraud per-
petrated upon him by the defendant it is necessary to 
keep in mind the facts and circumstances surrounding 
the execution of the contract between plaintiff and de-
fendant. 
At and prior to the time the contract was entered 
into the plaintiff was a resident of Tula Lake, California, 
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where he was engaged in farming and where he was the 
owner of farming equipment which enabled him to en-
gage in farming on a large scale. Plaintiff made it 
known to the defendant that if he, plaintiff, purchased 
land from the defendant that he, plaintiff, would move 
his farming equipment to Utah for the purpose of oper-
ating irrigated farming lands on a somewhat large scale. 
(Tr. '9-10-16 and 103) 
After plaintiff had learned from the state engineer 
that his water right applications would probably not be 
approved and after the defendant had refused to furnish 
plaintiff an abstract of title, the plaintiff, upon· advice 
of the state engineer, purchased 640 acres of land from 
the state and sought to have the applications to appro-
priate water theretofore applied for use on the lands 
which he contracted to purchase from defendant to the 
lands purchased from the state. (Tr. 17) It should also 
be noted that J. E. Thompson was not a party to the 
contract although he signed as a witness thereto. 
We have already pointed out that there is no pro-
vision in the contract which give·s the defendant any 
claim to the filing made by Thomps~n. It is reasonable 
to assume that Thompson would not consent to assign 
his filings to defendant. 
This court may take judicial notice of its own deci~ 
sion. It appears from the decision of this court in the 
case of McGa;rry vs. Thompson, 201 Pac. (2d) 288 
that Thompson, who was a party to that case and 
who is the same person as the Thompson who n1ade 
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the filings here inYolYed, \Yas and is in dPs pt_\ rn t e 
need of a w·ater filing to apply on land8 \rhieh he has 
acquired fron1 the state. That being so to grant plain-
tiff the right to a return of the nlon~_:}y paid b~· hiin 
to defendant on condition that plaintiff surrender to de-
fendant the "\Yater filings amounts to sheer mockery. The 
only chance that plaintiff has to succeed in his farming 
venture is to secure a water right. The water filings that 
plaintiff has made "\Yill probably not be what McGarry 
represented them to be but if plaintiff is permitted to re-
tain them that is the best he can get out of a poor bar-
gain. It should be kept in mind that the position in 
\vhich plaintiff now finds himself is due solely to the 
fraud of the defendant. 
If the case is viewed from the position of the de-
fendant what principles of law or equity entitles him 
to retain all of the profits of his fraudulent acts~ Why 
should he be entitled to retain not only the land covered 
by the contract and the $2600.00 which he fraudulently 
secured but also have conveyed to him the water filings 
which were paid for iby Frailey and Thompson~ Of 
course if he is permitted to do that then and in such 
case fraud pays very handsomely. Not only that but 
the law prohibiting speculating in the public waters of 
this state becomes a myth and the defendant is at liberty 
to again perpetrate a fraud by selling the water right 
at an enormous price upon some unsu.sp·ecting person 
who might desire to develop the natural resources of the 
state. If he succeeds in doing that he may, as in this 
case, retain any down payment that he may receive and 
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then proceed to repeat his fraudulent practices without 
end, all to his own enrichment and the retardation of the 
development of the ·state. 
The law is so well and uniformly settled to the effect 
that when a contract is rescinded the parties are to be 
placed in status quo that we shall cite only a few of the 
many authorities which so hold. 
''The very idea of rescinding a contract im-
plies that what has been parted with shall be re-
stored on both sides. Releasing one ·party from 
his part of the agreement and excusing him from 
making the other party whole do not seem agree-
able to reason or justice. Hence the general rule 
is that a party who wishes to rescind an agree-
runt must place the opposite party in statu quo.'' 
12 Am. Jur., page 1031, Sec. 451. 
Numerous cases will he found in the foot notes to 
the text which support the same. To the same effect 17 
C.J.S., page 919, ·Sec. 438, et seq, and cases there cited 
in foot notes. 
In this case the plaintiff by his amended complaint 
''offered to do equity in the premises and to cancel and 
return to the defendant his duplicate original of the 
contract above mentioned upon the receipt by the plain-
tiff of the consideration which he, the plaintiff, has paid 
to the defendant as hereinbefore alleged.'' All that the 
plaintiff received from the defendant was the contract 
of purchase which as ohove indicated he offered to cancel. 
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THE PLAINTIFF AND NOT THE DEFENDANT IS 
ENTITLED TO THE \V-ATER FILINGS MADE 
BY THE PL-AINTIFF UPON A RE-
CISSION OF THE CONTRACT. 
''Generally speaking the effect of re~rission 
is to extinguish the contract. The e.ontract is an-
nihilated so effectuallY that in conten1plation of 
law it has never had ~nY existence even for the 
purpose of being broken.· .. A.ceordingly it has been 
said that a la·wful rescission of an agreement puts 
an end to it for all purposes, not only to preclude 
the recovery of the contract price but also to pre-
vent the recovery of damages for breach of the 
contract. The effect of a rescission of an agree-
ment is to put the ·parties back in the same posi-
tion they were in prior to the making of the con-
tract * * * The party rescinding may, however, 
have a right to restitution with respect to any 
performance on his part." 12 Am. Ju.r. 1038, Sec. 
455, and cases cited in the foot notes. 
We have heretofore in this brief directed the at-
tention of the court to the memorandum of opinion of 
the trial court wherein it found that plaintiff was en-
titled- to rescind the contract because of fraud but then 
said that in order to exercise the right plaintiff must as-
sign his water filings and secure an . assignment of 
Thompson's water filings to defendant before he could 
exercise such right. To make the right of the plaintiff 
to rescind the contract conditioned upon the assignment 
of plaintiff's and Thompson's water filings to the de-
fendant is directly at variance with the very essence 
of the doctrine of rescission. Independent of the con tract 
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the defendant was wholly without even a color of right 
to the water applications. Such applications were made 
and paid for by the plaintiff and Thompson. In order 
to give the defendant any semblance of a claim to the 
water applications he must look to the contract. }\fore-
over as we have heretofore pointed out if the contract 
be looked at it is made crystal clear that the defendant 
is, by the con tract, illegaily speculating on a large scale 
in the public waters of this state. 
In its conclusions of law No. 2, page 77, the court 
concludes that said contract is not now subject to res-
cission because the plaintiff has not offered to rescind 
said contract in its entirety but demands a return of the 
down payment and cancellation of the contract, and as-
serts the right to retain all of the said water filings and 
applications. A similar thought is expressed in para-
graph 3 of the conclusions of law. (R,. 77 and in the first 
paragraph of the judgment and decree R. 79) We have 
assigned as error such conclusion of law and part of the 
judgment and decree in assignments numbered 7, 8, 11. 
The trial court having concluded that plaintiff was 
entitled to rescind the contract the defendant may not 
be heard to say that plaintiff must assign his own water 
applications and secure the assignment of Thompson's 
water applications to the defendant. The defendant 
never had any right to the water applications at or prior 
to the time the contract was entered into nor is the plain-
tiff hy the contract obligated to make any water filing 
or applications, much less did the defendant at the ti1ne 
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the contract "\Yas entered into or at all acquire any elaim 
to the filings made by Thon1pson. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CO·NCLUDIN(J 
THAT BEC.A.USE PL.AINTIFF BREACHED THE 
CONTR_A_CT DEFEND.A.NT IS ENTITLED TO 
RETAIN THE L_.:\_ND, THE 1\IONEY PAID 
ON THE CONTRACT AND THE 
WATER APPLICATIONS. 
In paragraph 4 of the Conclusions of Law (R. 77) 
and in the second paragraph of the Decree and Judg-
ment the trial court concluded and decreed that the 
plaintiff had forfeited all of his rights in the property 
mentioned in the contract because he had ibreached the 
contract. We have attacked such conclusion and part of 
the judgment by assignments numbered 9 and 10. 
In light of the court's finding that water was not 
available to satisfy the water applications it would seem 
a useless thing for the plaintiff to drill wells and plant 
crops if there is no water available. While there does 
not seem to be any evidence in the record touching the 
cost of drilling a well it does appear in the case of M c-
Garry vs. Thompson, 201 Pac. (2d) 288, 29'1, that the 
cost of drilling a well was $1975.00. It would indeed 
be a reckless undertaking to drill wells at a cost of 
nearly $2000.00 each when to do so would result in 
a failure to secure a permanent water supply and when 
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an attempt to drill a well may obligate the plaintiff 
to pay to defendant an additional $26,200.00 without 
regard to whether the well proved to be a success or a 
failure. 
Moreover, under the view taken by the trial court 
the plaintiff had a right to rescind the contract but be-
cause he sought the aid of the court in accomplishing 
his right he, the plaintiff, not only lost such right but was 
deprived of rights in his water filings and to the money 
he paid on the contract. Moreover, if the plaintiff had 
proceeded to perform the contract he would doubtless 
have been confronted with the claim that he had waived 
his right to a rescission because of the fraud perpetrated 
upon him. 
If the plaintiff is entitled to rescind the contract it 
follows as a matter of law that he is entitled to be placed 
in statu quo, that is to a return of the money paid on the 
contract and to retain the water applications which he 
paid for. As we have heretofore pointed out if plaintiff 
is dep-rived of the water filing he will be unable to pursue 
his farming venture in the Byrl district, if indeed he 
will ;be able to do so if he is permitted to retain the water 
filing. 
If the contract is rescinded and the defendant is 
given hack his land he will be in the same position that 
he was in when the contract was executed. Defendant 
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did not at the time the contract was entered into have 
any interest in the "Tater filings, nor did he under the 
terms of the contrart acquire any right to rt\quire the 
plaintiff to make any such filings. His claimed right 
comes, if at all, because the plaintiff made the filings after 
the contract \Yas executed. lTnder such a state of faets 
the doctrine of rescission is fully complied with by the 
plaintiff when the real estate described in the contract 
is returned to the defendant and the plaintiff is paid 
back the money, together "ith legal interest thereon and 
plaintiff is allowed to retain his water filings. 
In the foregoing brief we have attacked the con-
tract upon various grounds other than the fact that de-
fendant perpetrated fraud upon the plaintiff in securing 
the same. We have so attacked the contract because if 
the same is void for the reasons discussed it is incapable 
of being ratified. Moreover if the contract is void neither 
of the parties acquired any right thereunder. Under 
· such an instrument the defendant could not acquire any 
right to the water filings nor the money paid to him. If 
for example a contract is against public policy the same 
principles of public policy that condemns the contract 
likewise condemns an attempt to ratify the same and pre-
cludes the defendant from securing any rights there-
under. 
It may be that the defendant will attack the trial 
court's finding touching the question of fraud and further 
claim that the plaintiff waived the fraud. Such were 
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defendant's contentions before the trial court. Until 
we are advised of defendant's position in such respects 
we shall not discuss such matter but reserve our dis-
cussion thereof for a reply brief. 
It is submitted that plaintiff should he granted the 
relief prayed for in his amended complaint and that he 
be awarded his cost on this appeal. 
~espectfully submitted, 
ELIAS HAN:8EN 
Attorney for Appellant 
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